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Command, Control and Communications (CCC) has evolved through the years from 
simple switches, dials, analogue hardwire networks and lights to a modern computer based 
digital network. However there are two closely coupled pillars upon which a CCC system is 
built. The first, is that technology drives the pace of advancement. The second is that a 
culture that fosters resistance to change can limit technological advancements in the CCC 
system. While technology has advanced at a tremendous rate throughout the years, the 
change in culture has moved slowly. This paper will attempt to show through a historical 
perspective where specific design decisions for early CCC systems have erroneously evolved 
into general requirements being imposed on later systems. Finally this paper will provide a 
glimpse into the future directions envisioned for CCC capabilities that will enable 21st 
century missions. 
A. Introduction 
A s we step through the changes in our nation's space program, from the first steps initiated by the Constellation program with its daring goal to return humans to the moon and then propel them onto Mars; to the bold new 
steps of NASA's changing direction, we should reflect on where our journey has taken us. From test flights 
launched from mosquito infested swamps, to man's first footsteps on the moon. From the transition of the Apollo 
prograJ11 to the Space Shuttle program, through Shuttle sustainment and upgrades, to the forward looking strategies 
of the Exploration program. We are now perched at the brink of change. We must be prepared to execute our 
nation's new vision for space exploration and we must be equipped to adapt quickly and seamlessly to whatever 
direction it may take us. What capabilities will be required as we move from a large scale human launch capability 
to one of commercial growth and expansion? What will be required for heavy lift capabilities? What will be the role 
of a government space agency? Are there any foreseeable speed bumps in our path? Will this path be the one we 
sustain or are we destined to alter course with ever changing political goals? Or, will this be the trigger that catapults 
mankind forever into space, to travel farther and farther from our home world? Will history judge this new path to 
be the defining moment in space exploration where mankind made the tough choices that will inevitably preserve 
our species? As we prepare to walk this new path, the only thing we know for certain, is that we do not know 
anything for certain. As we move forward we must continue to push the boundaries of technology. However, NASA 
must also advance its behavior, its norms, and its culture. The NASA of today cannot succeed without becoming the 
NASA of tomorrow. 
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B. Historical Perspective 
The development, sustainment, and operations of Command, Control, and Communications (CCe) systems at 
the Kennedy Space Center have been essential since the arrival of the very first rockets; when teams of engineers 
and technicians carried the CCC hardware in the trunks of their cars from the Redstone Arsenal in Huntsville, 
Alabama to support an emergent launch campaign in Florida. As rocket complexity grew and the number of 
launches increased, reinstallation and revalidation of this mobile CCC system became an increasing schedule risk. It 
soon became apparent that a local, resident CCC capability was required. In the early days of this in-house CCC 
system, control actions were manual in nature. Human launch controllers managed the launch process with a 
hardware-only system of switches, gauges, lights and dials that required a dedicated human interface to perform 
every function, throw every switch, and verify every light and gauge. This approach was an acceptable solution due 
to the relatively simple systems that were being controlled and to the technologies that were available at the time. 
During the Apollo program, simple automation through hardware relay logic was added. Digital logic was 
incorporated during the Shuttle program, providing the means for control to be performed by software. 
Advancements in software capability would, over time, drive the need for increased hardware performance. 
Ultimately this need could not be met by the aging CCC system, causing the software capability to plateau because 
of constraints imposed by the existing hardware performance characteristics. In turn, ~hen old hardware was 
replaced by new more advanced technology, it was constrained so that it did not impact the existing software 
pedigree. This set off a vicious cycle where changes to either hardware or software were constrained by either the 
existing hardware characteristics or the known software pedigree. The fallacy of changing either the software or the 
hardware but not both, when hardware and software is tightly coupled, is that the net system capability remains 
unchanged. 
A. Apollo 
As human spaceflight drove the development of larger and more complex launch vehicles, the number of actions 
that needed to be performed for launch increased, while the timing between those actions became more critical thus 
forcing the development of automated ground processes for the Saturn rocket. In the era of Apollo, computational 
devices were rare; and while some did exist, they were not utilized to automate critical ground control functions. 
This type of automation was accomplished through hardware relay logic that was straightforward enough for the 
engineers to operate and troubleshoot; however, it did present challenges in testing the numerous electrical 
connections from the Apollo vehicle to the ground systems. 
B. Space Shuttle 
During the time period between the last Apollo mIssIon and the beginning of the Space Shuttle program, 
technology advanced to the point where mini-computer based systems were more common. However a commercial 
CCC capability that could be used to perform hazardous man-rated launch operations did not yet exist. This lead to 
the development of Kennedy Space Center's Launch Processing System (LPS). 
C. Launch Processing System (LPS) 
Kennedy Space Center was awarded the task of developing a CCC system to support ground and launch 
processing of the new Space Shuttle. Unlike previous launch vehicles, the Space Shuttle was designed with digital 
computers that interfaced to the ground launch processing system via a digital launch data bus. Designing the launch 
data bus protocol and its digital interface to the onboard computers was a challenging task, especially since the 
onboard system was developed concurrently with the ground launch processing system. Small changes to the 
onboard system could cause large impacts to the ground design. In addition, designers were faced with the 
challenges of developing a mechanism for interfacing digital ground system components and an approach to passing 
commands and data through the system in a'deterministic manner. The CCC system that was eventually deployed 
was referred to as the Launch Processing System (LPS) and consisted of three major components .. The first was the 
Checkout, Control and Monitoring System (CCMS), which was the heart of the command and control system. The 
second was the Central Data System (CDS), which supported data recording and retrieval of processed data. The 
third was the Record and Playback System (RPS), which recorded all raw data. For CCMS, each console in the 
firing room and every frontend interface to either Ground Support Equipment (GSE) or the Space Shuttle was 
connected through a point-to-point system which used a common data buffer as its prime communications channel. 
The advantage of this system was speed and deterministic behavior that ensured every message followed a known 
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and repeatable path. Using a common data buffer as the communication mechanism was an innovation for 1970's 
technology; however, today this approach severely limits the scalability of the LPS. 
Prior to delivery of the LPS, several single point failures were identified. One of the most critical was a failure of 
the common data buffer, which could result in a loss of ground control due to the inability of the CCC system to 
communicate with the Space Shuttle and GSE. The solution that was implemented to mitigate this risk was to add a 
hardwired emergency safing system, which bypassed the digital CCC system and provided limited emergency 
control of Shuttle and GSE end-items. Though in hindsight, a major failure of the CCC system requiring the use of 
hardwired safing has never occurred; however, time and effort continues to be expended testing it prior to each 
launch. In the years since the initial Space Shuttle flight the actual hardwires have been replaced by a network-based 
system that does not utilize the primary command paths. Many LPS users have expressed a belief that hardwire 
safing is a salient part of any CCC system, and insist on its inclusion without analyzing the requirement to include it. 
As such, the hardwire or emergency safing system has found its way into the requirements of every CCC project 
under development since the creation of LPS, including those were other design alternatives existed. 
Another deficiency of the LPS system is that it was designed with a custom software language that was 
developed in-house to allow operations engineers (operators) to directly specify command and response behavior 
without them needing specialized software development skills. This provided the benefit that operators could 
troubleshoot both the vehicle and GSE as well as the software that ran in the CCC system. Today this software 
seriously inhibits the ability to develop complex software algorithms for advanced processing such as control using 
frequency domain interaction instead Of the traditional time domain, or analysis of system state by implementing 
advanced cluster or set theory. 
With any system that has operated for more than thirty years, obsolescence has been and continues to be an issue 
with the Space Shuttle LPS. Through the years, hardware subsystems have been replaced in a piecewise manner 
with new technology that has been modified to operate exactly like the original equipment. This means that in most 
cases the capabilities inherent in the new technology have been intentionally hobbled and reduced in speed so that 
the rest of the system will not be impacted. The net result is that architecturally the LPS has not changed since it's 
inception in the late 1970s. 
D. Checkout and Launch Control System (CLCS) 
In the late 1990's, an attempt was made to replace the aging LPS with a new Checkout and Launch Control 
System (CLCS). One of the goals of this system was to solve the obsolescence issues facing LPS by replacing aging 
less efficient hardware, and utilizing modem software development techniques. Another goal was to concurrently 
design and develop hardware and software throughout the core infrastructure; eliminating the problems lassociated 
with the piecewise changes made to the LPS system. 
While no CCC system is perfect, CLCS suffered some of the same issues many development efforts experience 
when the goal is to replace an operational system. First, the existing LPS was mature with more than 30 years of 
runtime; and its operators were comfortable with its problems because they were largely considered to be known, 
understood, and characterized. Secondly, CLCS represented wholesale changes to the CCC architecture and would 
have required the application software to be rewritten using a language that was not easily understood by most 
operators. And finally, the operators were uncomfortable with such sweeping changes; partly because the "black 
box" technology made them feel uncertain that the requirements LPS fulfilled could be met and partly because 
understanding the code required specialized software development skills. 
Refactoring an existing critical control capability poses two interesting dilemmas. First, the users/operators often 
insisted on what was familiar, that the new system work exactly like the old one; however, this negated most of the 
technological advancements that could have been implemented. Unfortunately, the typical compromise was to 
design the system such that it provided CCC capability that was as close as possible to what the current system 
offered with a caveat that new capability would be added at some later date. This approach only served to continue 
the culture of piecewise CCC design and development, thus fostering the same problems associated with technology " 
gaps between hardware and software implementations. The second dilemma is that claiming a new CCC architecture ' 
improved safety was often viewed by others as substantiating that the old system was not safe. This statement could 
not have been any further from the truth than saying a car without anti-lock brakes should not be driven. When using 
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the old system, conditions that pose high safety risks are mitigated through alternative means. For instance, a person 
who wants to drive a car on slick snowy roads would chose the car with the anti-lock brakes; however, on dry 
'nominal driving surfaces it is a wash, both cars are equally safe. Similarly, updating a CCC system to operate with 
up-to-date software and hardware technologies provides the ability to safely launch under certain conditions that 
were not acceptable with the old system. For example, because a critical common data buffer failure could cripple 
the ability of the LPS to communicate with the Shuttle and GSE, a hardwire safing system was mandated. Suppose a 
new CCC system was developed such that this type of single-point failure was covered by redundant path software 
safing? Does hardwire safing really need to be included? These two dilemmas stifle the development of upgraded 
CCC capabilities because the question that is inevitably asked if the system cannot claim it improves safety and is 
designed to emulate the old is "Is this endeavor worth the time, effort, and money?" 
As the Space Shuttle program winds down, it will end using the same LPS architecture that was developed for its 
maiden flight more than thirty years ago. If the next program has comparable stamina and longevity, the same issues 
with obsolescence, implementing new technology, and applying innovative software solutions, will eventually 
resurface if not addressed upfront. 
C. Current Activity 
A. Constellation 
When the national space policy shifted to the vision for space exploration, NASA was presented with a unique 
opportunity. For the first time in thirty years, NASA would not be replacing or upgrading an existing CCC system, it 
would be creating a new one from the ground up. By definition, change was required, NASA would no longer be 
flying Space Shuttles; it would be launching new classes of rockets and spacecraft. NASA began this endeavor by 
defining the "Needs, Goals and Objectives" of the Constellation program and then by developing a set of 
architectural requirements. Lessons learned from the previous fifty years of launch history were reviewed and a top 
down architecture that included Command, Control, Communications, and Information (C3I)i was developed. For 
the first time, the CCC architecture considered an Information component to address data design, metadata (data 
attributes) design, and relationships between the ground and flight elements. 
B. Launch Control System (LCS) 
The Launch Control System design effort was based on three major architectural tenets. First, the system had to 
be sustainable for forty years. Second, the system had to be standards-based and not tied to a single vendor. Third, 
the system had to be designed for flexibility and adaptability to support the requirements of future spacecraft and 
launch vehicles that could not be articulated in the present. To achieve this, several trade studies were performed and 
a proof-of-conceptii system was implemented to ensure that the architectural tenets had a viable implementation 
approach. Ultimately the LCS architecture was designed around the Data Distribution Service (DDS) standards 
approved by the Object Management Group (OMG). LCS represented a major shift in strategy for designing CCC 
systems at the Kennedy Space Center. This was the first project to fully embrace Commercial-Off-The-Shelf 
(COTS) software in a critical CCC system. One of the proof-of-concept goals was to develop at least two 
implementations of each major component and then validate that the architectural tenets could be implemented using 
Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS) products. A large majority of the development effort revolved around 
integrating various COTS capabilities into a unified system, while ensuring that the design did not rely on any 
specific vendor. While the individual LCS components. were implemented with COTS products, the architecture 
itself was COTS product neutral; meaning that the system characteristics were defined without consideration of 
specific vendor capabilities. 
The Standards Based Architecture (SBA) shown to be viable through the proof-of-concept activity was then 
baselined and the LCS project began full development activities. During development" each Computing System 
Configuration Items (CSCI) team performed trade studies, if necessary, to evaluate different solutions that could 
satisfy the system implementation; evaluating not only COTS solutions but also Government-Off-The-Shelf 
(GaTS), Modified-Off-The-Shelf (MOTS) and Open Source Capabilities. In most cases, this evaluation resulted in 
the selection of COTS capabilities to fill those needs. Even though many CSCI teams opted to utilize COTS 
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solutions, open source will playa significant role in the future. Open Source software is the middle ground between 
the cost of large in-house development efforts and the cost of sustaining and licensing COTS solutions. The trade-
off when using COTS solutions is that they can offer lower development costs but they often require large licensing 
costs to sustain. Open Source on the other hand, often requires higher development costs but provides containment 
of sustaining costs. In the future, the manner in which open source software is managed, tested and certified may tip 
the scales away from COTS. 
Finally, LCS embraced the Information Architecture iii proposed by the Constellation program and the concept of 
modeling the information and the relationships between the information in an ontology model. This model was then 
used to derive all of the build products that the LCS system needed to properly configure each of the CSCIs. The 
benefit of this approach over previous CCC system implementations was that changes to the information could be 
managed much more efficiently. Data updates to the Information Architecture would be converted to data files 
through an automated build process. In this way, the LCS system could adapt and change without requiring source 
code to be updated and re-verified. 
D. Future Directions 
LCS was designed and built as a generic CCC infrastructure. In fact throughout its development, the following 
principle was used to determine the system capabilities: "LCS should be able to launch a rocket or make toast," 
depending on the application software that is loaded on it. The LCS system was not only built to be used by Orion 
and Ares but also to be adapted to other spacecraft. As far as LCS was concerned it was communicating with a 
network appliance that spoke a dialect of C31. The three tenets of LCS have not changed. It was designed upfront for 
longevity. It was designed to be sustainable beyond the lifetime of any individual vendor or technology. And it is 
able to support future customer needs that cannot be articulated in the present. 
Looking into the future, at least three roles for NASA can be postulated where specific capabilities of a CCC 
system would be needed. The first role is one of NASA insight and mission assurance. If commercial entities launch 
from a NASA-owned launch pad, some level of resource protection would drive a minimal monitor-only capability. 
The second role would be one of supporting test flights for a Heavy Lift Launch Vehicle (HLLV). For the HLLV it 
is assum~d that NASA would need the ability to command the launch vehicle. The third role is one of providing 
support to commercial launch services. While the exact services required to provide a commercial launch provider 
the best opportunity for success are currently unknown, educated guesses can be made until an opportunity exists to 
make direct inquiries. Some of the capabilities that would be needed are the core infrastructure inherent in launching 
from a NASA launch pad, such as, voice cOl11munications, imagery, paging and area warning, network infrastructure 
and basic command and control. 
, The following questions represent example capabilities being discussed to further bound the CCC space. Will a 
commercial launch entity want to bring their launch team to KSC and launch out of the Launch Control Center 
(LCC)? Should KSC support virtual launch teams? If a commercial entity has an existing CCC system, should 
NASA provide the capability to remotely connect to the launch pad from anywhere on the planet; why bring the 
launch team and the CCC system to KSC? Can NASA provide any additional services to augment the commercial 
customer's existing capability? Should NASA provide other capabilities such as: manufacturing support, post liftoff 
capabilities, or launch expertise? What unique capabilities should NASkprovide to ensure that each commercial 
entity is successful? These higher level capabilities, while postulated, are awaiting future discussions to determine 
implementation and prioritization strategies. 
E. Conclusion 
As discussed in this paper, NASA has amassed a large experience-base for performing critical Command and 
Control of launch vehicles and ground systems. And as NASA continues move forward, it is important to assess past 
CCC systems for Lessons Learned; capturing both successes and failures. Requirements sho~ld be reevaluated for 
applicability and retained if relevant and thrown away if not. For example, if LPS developed a hardwire safing 
system to solve a single point failure of the common data buffer, that does not imply hardwire safing should be an 
implicit requirement of future CCC systems. Requirements for new or upgraded systems should not insist that 
requirements from past systems be incorporated unless an independent evaluation deems them necessary. 
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The state of CCC system design has evolved from manual controls, to hardware-only controls, to digital and 
microprocessor-based controls, to those of today where software performs a majority of the system functions. 
Because of this, it is no longer sufficient to design CCC hardware in a vacuum; the software must be architected and 
designed concurrently, especially if system components are expected to interoperate. 
Architectural and cultural impediments to implementing advanced and/or complex software in future CCC 
systems must be tackled. The CCC hardware and software should be decoupled such that changes or upgrades made 
to one should not impact the other. Operations engineers should not have to understand the CCC software in order to 
operate the system. In other words, system operators should treat the software like a "black box" that is sustained by 
personnel with software development skills who are responsible for performing upgrades and troubleshooting 
anomalies. 
To successfully support a commercial launch capability, it is imperative that NASA as an agency asks its 
customers, "What can we do to make you successful?" This single question must be the foremost consideration for 
charting a path to success. As NASA embraces this new commercial launch services direction, our future success 
will be judged not on how well we perform, but ultimately on how successful new commercial space initiatives are. 
It is time for a new group of commercial operators to be allowed to earn their wings. They must be successful, for 
NASA and this country to have any chance of succeeding at exploration of space beyond Low Earth Orbit. We must 
adapt and change our behavior if we wish to have a relevant role in the future. As Norman Peale, the author of "The 
Power of Positive Thinking," once said: "If you want things to be different, perhaps the answer is to become 
different yourself." 
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